WHAT'S ALL THE WORRY ABOUT A CRASH

The need for a win-win

public relations strategy

by Steve Hoeser

29 April 1993

Introduction: The SSTO/SSRT opponents have us on the defensive and we're letting them put us there. I see us falling back into the standard practice of defending our program when we should be on the offensive. This is a formula for disaster.

Background: The opposition first used the tactic of saying that we couldn't build the DC-X and that it was a stunt. But their actions to kill it showed instead that they were deathly afraid that we might do. Showing that you can build some very impressing hardware fast and cheap, took a big chunk out of the establishment's credibility.

Failing the kill technique, the opposition is now posturing to exploit a crash. They will not only pounce on us when we're down they will send in a full nuclear strike.

Conclusion: It is time to take the offensive with a public relations strategy capable of claiming victory regardless of the DC-X test.

Recommendation: The entire SSTO/SSRT support structure adopt the position that, breaking the DC-X is and always was part of the plan. This must start now lest we give the opposition the weapon of plausible denial by waiting until after a crash.

Discussion: A preemptive and sustained public relations bombardment is needed to take away the opposition's ammunition. Key support factions and the public at large need to clearly understand that X-Vehicle programs break things because that is what they are supposed to do. Most importantly, this may very well include crashing the vehicle.

* It has always been an accepted fact that the DC-X would break and could even crash (somehow it seems that people working the program have forgotten this). Part of developing operations procedures is that things break and things get fixed. Test airplanes crash, get repaired, and fly again. I can think of no more devestating a blow to the opposition than to crash this beast, fix it and fly it again. "We never could have done that after a command destruct!"

* X-Vehicle programs push to find the limits. This is what saves money ad makes the prototypes and operational vehicles work.

* We need to prepare responses for the following conditions:

• The vehicle breaks (minor damage): Well we figured it would break, now we can find out the best ways to fix it.
• The vehicle crashes: Well we planned to break it and we did a bang-up job. Now we'll get a chance to check out how tough the beast really was and see if we can make her fly again.
• An inherent design flaw is discovered in test: We find out from data that under certain flight conditions there is a high probability that the vehicle could crash. We must identify the design problem, determine a fix, then announce termination of the flight test program. Its stupid to wreck the hardware when we don't have to. Besides, it will look a lot better in the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum in one piece than in a big pile. (((Kyger comment: It's also vendication of flight test as the means of obtaining real world data, as opposed to analysis and paper shuffling -- even if the data are negative.)))
• The vehicle successfully completes the entire initial test series: We met our initial test objectives. We could have flown (or would have liked to fly) more but we're out of money. But enough is as good as a feast and it would be little more than grandstanding to fly more..