Space Access Update is Space Access Society's semi-weekly publication. Space Access Society's goal is to promote affordable access to space for all, period. We believe in concentrating our limited resources at whatever point looks like yielding maximum progress toward this goal.
For the moment, our main focus is on supporting BMDO's "SSRT" (Single Stage Rocket Technology) program, DC-X and its planned-but-not-yet-funded followon, SX-2. Space Access Update is thus for the moment largely about the technology and politics of DC-X and SX-2.
We anticipate a change of focus in a couple of months, if all goes well. Once SX-2 startup funding is (with your help!) assured, we plan to begin working on establishment of a healthy second X-rocket development track at NASA, and on getting development of suitable engines started for the fully reusable orbital ships that should come after SX-2 and NASA's X-rocket.
With luck and hard work, we should see one or more fully reusable SSTO testbeds flying to orbit toward the end of this decade, with production prototypes entering test a couple of years after that. Join us and help us make this happen.
Henry Vanderbilt, Editor, Space Access Update
[For more info on Space Access Society, on our next annual conference "Space Access '94 (March 11-13 in Scottsdale, Arizona) or on the DC-X/SSTO video we've recently begun shipping, write us at 4855 E Warner Rd #24-150, Phoenix AZ 85044, or email hvanderbilt@bix.com.]
[Editors note -- For those of you seeing this for the first time who need a bit more context, look for the subsequent post titled "DC-X Background".]
DC-X (and its test site at White Sands Missile Range) is still on standby, shut down but not yet torn down and trucked away, with a small maintenance crew keeping an eye on things. It has been in this state since the end of October, when flight test funding ran out.
Funding for resumption of DC-X flight test has been appropriated in the fiscal year 1994 Department of Defense budget, and completion of DC-X's flight test program is specifically called for in the accompanying DOD authorization legislation. (See attachment containing full text of the Congressional FY'94 DOD space launch funding launguage.)
The problem is that funding now has to go through ARPA (DOD's Advance Research Projects Agency, DC-X's new home) to be passed on to BMDO, who will then in turn pass it on to McDonnell Douglas Aerospace (MDA), the actual DC-X construction and test contractor. This is a new path; the procedures and persons responsible for funding DC-X haven't yet been established at ARPA.
It's only been a week since the DOD funding bills were finally passed, but there's not much excuse for delay in this particular matter. DC-X is an existing program temporarily put on hold. ARPA is now responsible for DC-X as part of its responsibility for the continuation of BMDO's SSRT (Single Stage Rocket Technology) program, and DC-X's flight test program is specifically mentioned for completion in the FY'94 DOD Authorization, section 213, subsection b, item 1A: "(1) $17,000,000 shall be available for the single-stage rocket technology (SSRT) program, including - (A) completion of phase one of the SSRT program begun in the Ballistic Missile Defense Office..." DC-X's flight test program is mandated for completion in the accompanying report language, section 213, paragraph 8: "The funds shall also be used to complete phase one of the single stage rocket technology program..." "Shall be used" is pretty unambiguous.
There are restrictions and conditions on spending for DC-X's followon, the SX-2, but there is no restriction on immediate restart of DC-X flight test, and no excuse for delay. The crew is standing by, the hardware is gathering dust. Every day that passes without ARPA funding resumption of DC-X flight test is a day wasted.
As reported in our last issue, the FY'94 DOD Appropriations bill as finally passed contains $40 million total for the SSRT program, including both completion of DC-X flight test and startup of DC-X's followon, the SX-2 high-speed suborbital reusable rocket.
Regular readers will recall that as of SAU #27, we were still worried about what sort of anti-SSTO "gotcha's" the companion FY'94 DOD Authorizations bill might end up carrying. We are pleased to report that while there are a number of hedges and restrictions on going ahead with SX-2, none of them are insurmountable.
The most noteworthy restriction is a requirement that the SSRT program hold off on releasing to industry the RFP (Request For Proposals) for SX-2 until OSTP (the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy) comes back with the results of yet another review of national space launch policies and programs, sometime in January at the earliest.
Positive treatment in this OSTP study is vital to getting started on SX-2 in 1994. The OSTP study is supposed to define future Administration space launch policy. Very likely if it doesn't come back with a positive evaluation of reusable SSTO rockets in general and the SSRT program in particular, release of the SX-2 RFP (and thus the start of the bidding for the contract to build SX-2) will be delayed indefinitely, with the SSRT program downgraded to at best a low-level paper study program, and possibly killed outright.
We need to get two things done: Restart DC-X flight test as soon as possible, and make sure that SSTO gets fair and reasonable treatment in the OSTP report due out in January.
Restarting DC-X flight test is a useful goal both for its own sake and because it will establish a funding path for further SSTO work via ARPA, blazing a trail for SX-2.
Getting a fair shake for reusable SSTO rockets in the upcoming White House Office of Science and Technology Policy space launch report is vital to getting SX-2 solidly underway in the coming year.
We're going to recommend that you contact various members of Congress on the first point, restarting DC-X flight test. Congress funds ARPA, Congress voted in the law that now requires ARPA to continue DC-X flight test, and members of Congress will be listened to if they ask ARPA to do so with minimal delay.
We're also going to do something a little bit different, and recommend that you contact the Vice President (and former Senator from Tennessee), Al Gore, on both the first and second points.
As a senior member of the Clinton Administration (and as their de facto lead man on hi-tech issues), Gore has far more direct influence at OSTP than any member of Congress, and also should have some level of influence at ARPA. (The President, of course, could simply tell ARPA and OSTP what to do, but given the other demands for his attention, the limited level of uproar we few can raise, and VP Gore's known interest in matters of high tech, we are far more likely to get useful results by talking to Gore.)
Recommended Action:
Phone, fax, or write Representative John Murtha, Representative Pat Schroeder, and (if you've already been in touch with them this year on the subject of DC-X) your own representative and/or Senators. Thank them for their support for the DOD SSRT program, and ask them to make sure that ARPA restarts DC-X flight testing as soon as possible, as called for in the FY'94 DOD Authorization.
If you're writing or faxing, or if you phone and the person who answers asks for more background, explain DC-X's history, from initial proposal to flying hardware in less than three years for less than $70 million, and its current situation, grounded in mid-flight test due to slow-arriving funds, as briefly as possible in your own words.
Phone, fax, or write VP Gore's office, and ask that he make sure that reusable Single Stage To Orbit rockets get full and fair consideration in the current OSTP space launch policy review, and that he make sure that ARPA restarts DC-X flight testing as soon as possible, as called for in the 1994 DOD Authorization.
If you're writing or faxing, or if you phone and the person who answers asks for more background, explain the need for and the advantages of reusable SSTO space launchers, in your own words, as briefly as possible. (See the companion piece "DC-X Background" for more on this.)
John Murtha, House Appropriations Committee, Defense Subcommittee Chair
phone(202) fax address
225-2065 225-5709 2423 RHOB, Washington DC 20515
Patricia Schroeder, House Armed Serviced Committee, Research & Technology
Subcommittee Chair
phone(202) fax address
225-4431 225-5842 2208 RHOB, Washington DC 20515
Al Gore, Vice President of the United States
phone(202) fax address
456-2326 456-7044 The Honorable Albert Gore
Office of the Vice President
Old Executive Office Building
Washington DC 20501
When I first volunteered for this job, I figured it would be five years before we knew if we'd succeeded or failed in talking the country into a whole new approach to the problem of getting into space affordably.
A year and a half down, three and a half to go. So far, so good.
Henry Vanderbilt "Reach low orbit and you're halfway to anywhere
Space Access Society in the Solar System."
4855 E Warner Rd #24-150 - Robert A. Heinlein
Phoenix, AZ 85044
602 431-9283 voice/fax "You can't get there from here."
(hvanderbilt@bix.com) - Anonymous
"SSTO? C'mon, the only people who support that are Trekkies
and right-wingers." - The Unknown Staffer
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------------------------------Attachment---------------------------------
Final Congressional FY'94 DOD Space Funding Language
(from the Congressional Record, November 9th and 10th, 1993)
(full text -- approximately 250 lines)
(DOD FY'94 Authorizations Conference Bill, Space-Related Sections)
SEC 213. SPACE MODERNIZATION PLAN
(a) PLAN REQUIRED. -
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall develop a plan that establishes and
clearly defines priorities, goals, and milestones regarding modernization of
space launch capabilities for the Department of Defense, or, if appropriate,
for the Government as a whole. The plan shall specify whether the Secretary
intends to allocate funds for a new space launch vehicle or other major space
launch development initiative in the next future-years defense program
submitted pursuant to section 221 of title 10, United States Code.
(2) The plan shall be developed in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Science and Technology Policy.
(3) The Secretary shall submit the plan to Congress at the same time in
1994 that the Secretary submits to Congress the next future-years defense
program.
(b) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS - Of the amount authorized to be appropriated in
section 201, $35,000,000 shall be available through the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology for research,
development, test, and evaluation of new non-man-rated space launch systems
and technologies. None of that amount may be obligated or expended for any
operational United States space launch vehicle system in existence as of the
date of the enactment of this Act. Of that amount -
(1) $17,000,000 shall be available for the single-stage rocket technology
(SSRT) program, including -
(A) completion of phase one of the SSRT program begun in the Ballistic
Missile Defense Office;
(B) concept studies for new reusable space launch vehicles;
(C) data base development on domestic and foreign launch systems to
support design-to-cost, engine development, and reduced life-cycle costs; and
(D) examination of reusable engine thrust chamber component applications
to achieve advanced producibility, cost, and durability information needed
for improved designs; and
(2) $18,000,000 shall be available for similar tasks related to expendable
launch vehicles, including -
(A) concept studies for new expendable launch vehicles;
(B) data base development on domestic and foreign launch systems to
support design-to-cost, engine development, and reduced life-cycle costs; and
(C) examination of reusable engine thrust chamber component applications
to achieve advanced producibility, cost, and durability information needed
for improved designs.
(c) REQUIREMENTS REGARDING DEVELOPMENT OF NEW LAUNCH VEHICLES. - If the space
launch plan under subsection (a) identifies a new, non-man-rated expendable
or reusable launch vehicle technology for development or acquisition, the
Secretary shall explore innovative government-industry funding, management,
and acquisition strategies to minimize the cost and time involved.
(d) COST REDUCTION REQUIREMENT. - The plan shall provide for a means of
reducing the cost of producing existing launch vehicles at current and
projected production rates below the current estimates of the costs for those
production rates.
(e) STUDY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND FOREIGN SPACE LAUNCH
VEHICLES. -
(1) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a comprehensive study of the
differences between existing United States and foreign space launch vehicles
in order -
(A) to identify specific differences in the design, manufacture,
processing, and overall management and infrastructure of such space launch
vehicles; and
(B) to determine the approximate effect of the differences on the
relative cost, reliability, and operational efficiency of such space launch
vehicles.
(2) The Secretary shall consult with the Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration and, as appropriate, the heads of other
Federal agencies and appropriate personnel of United States industries and
academic institutions in carrying out the study.
(3) The Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the results of the
study no later than October 1, 1994.
<end of section 213>
(DOD FY'94 Authorization Conference Report, Space-Related Sections)
Space launch modernization (sec. 213)
The budget request included $53.9 million for the national launch system
(NLS) program, $43.3 million for the national aerospace plane (NASP), $58.5
million for medium launch vehicle (MLV) RDT&E, $330.7 million for Titan space
launch vehicle RDT&E, and $4.88 million for single-stage rocket technology
(SSRT).
The House bill would authorize the requested amount for NLS; add $36.7
million for NASP, $37.0 million for MLV improvements, $15.0 million for a
Centaur upper stage processing facility for Titan, and, in a legislative
provision (sec. 217), $75.0 million for SSRT.
The Senate amendment would deny the request for NLS and NASP, reduce the
request for Titan by $24.1 million due to the availability of prior-year
funds for upper stage vehicle research, and approve the request for MLV and
SSRT. In addition, the Senate amendment would authorize $30.0 million for
RDT&E on new launch vehicle technology. The Senate amendment included a
provision (sec. 214) that would require the Secretary of Defense to develop a
space launch roadmap which focuses available resources on a single
development or acquisition effort.
The House recedes on MLV and Titan funding and the provision on SSRT. The
House recedes with an amendment on the space launch roadmap provision.
The Senate recedes on prior-year upper stage vehicle funding.
The conferees agree that the national aerospace plane should be phased out in
an orderly fashion in fiscal year 1994. The conferees conclude that the
Department of Defense cannot afford to pursue an X-plane development program
at this time. The conferees do believe that the Department, preferably in
cooperation with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, should
retain a vigorous level-of-effort technology program in hypersonic vehicles.
Accordingly, the conferees agree to authorize $40.0 million for hypersonic
vehicle research. The conferees direct the Secretary of the Air Force to
report to the congressional defense committees no later than April 1, 1994,
on the allocation of these funds, the funding profile for the balance of the
Future Years Defense Program, and the relationship between the DOD and NASA
programs.
The conferees understand that the President's Science Advisor intends to
review national space launch policy and programs again. This review may
supersede the recommendations contained in the Department of Defense Bottom
Up Review which concluded that the Department could not afford any new launch
acquisition programs, despite an acknowledgement of serious deficiencies in
space launch capabilities and competitiveness.
To preserve options for the Administration during this planned review, the
conferees agree to modify the Senate provision to authorize $35.0 million
for space launch modernization for fiscal year 1994, despite the conclusions
of the DOD Bottom-Up Review. This amount includes the $4.88 million
requested for launch technology within the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization. These funds shall be used to keep the various technology and
system options open. The funds shall also be used to complete phase one of
the single stage rocket technology program, and to continue the space
transportation main engine effort.
If the Administration decides to pursue any new technology or acquisition
programs, they shall be competitively awarded. The conferees also stress the
importance of ensuring that small- and medium-sized companies are able to
compete in any new program.
The Conferees agree with the Senate position that the Administration must
stop trying to keep multiple space launch programs alive despite ever-
dwindling resources. The conferees agree that the Administration must focus
scarce resources to achieve any success at all.
The conferees recognize the merits in all the major competing technologies,
including airbreathing propulsion, single-stage rocket technology, and rugged
expendable concepts. The conferees also recognize that there may be
opportunities to improve existing systems in terms of cost, reliability, and
responsiveness. At the same time, based on unfortunate experience, the
conferees are extremely wary of excessive optimism on costs, schedule, and
performance.
The conferees are concerned that the U.S. commercial launch industry is
rapidly losing ground to foreign competitors, which in turn is driving up the
cost of U.S. government launches. The conferees are also concerned that the
existing systems enjoy a near monopoly position for launches of government
payloads in their respective weight and volume classes. In addition to
offering few incentives for cost control, this situation has resulted in a
large excess industrial capacity as the number of actual and planned
government satellite launches has declined. In addition, overall, NASA and
the Department of Defense have demonstrated a remarkable inability to work
together. Across the government, a debilitating culture favors complexity,
fragility, and accommodation to unique payload demands. To date, neither the
government nor industry has attempted to approach space launch as they do
cargo transport by truck, rail, ships, or aircraft. In these areas,
standardization, rugged design, performance margins, low cost, and
responsiveness are of overriding importance.
These problems are well-known: most, in fact, were addressed by the recent
DOD review. The Department concluded, however, that these problems were not
pressing enough to warrant a major initiative in the current budget
environment.
The conferees fear that this course will lead to an obsolete and ineffective
U.S. launch industry over the long term, while national security concerns
could preclude significant reliance on foreign systems - despite heavy
dependence on foreign sources in other critical defense industries. The
conferees expect the Administration to come to grips with these issues and be
prepared to present a coherent set of policies and programs to Congress early
next year.
It is widely asserted that foreign launch vehicle programs enjoy distinct
advantages over U.S. launch systems in terms of cost and responsiveness. The
provision would require the Department of Defense to study this issue, in
parallel with a National Aeronautics and Space Administration study.
<end of sec. 213 report language>
(DOD FY'94 Appropriations Conference Bill, Space-Related Section)
SPACE AND RELATED PROGRAMS
The House and Senate each included specific direction for many of the
various DOD and intelligence space and related programs. The conferees
agree with the language contained in the two different reports except as
addressed elsewhere in this joint statement or as modified in this section.
The conferees believe it is premature in fiscal year 1994 to begin the
aggressive development of a new medium launch vehicle.
The conferees are unwilling at this time to endorse the evolution of
improvements to Pegasus and Taurus class small lift vehicles and the
suggestion that the Defense Department should spur development of
alternative competitive vehicles.
The conferees agree that the Defense Department and intelligence community
should provide, not later than 1 June 1994, a technologically achievable
and affordable plan for how current and planned large payloads may be
downsized on a reasonable schedule to permit launch on a medium lift
vehicle. The conferees believe it is premature to decide now as to when
such downsizing can be achieved.
SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES
The conferees agree to provide a total of $60,000,000 to ARPA for research
and development activities for space launch vehicles. The conferees agree
not to provide $53,906,000 to the Air Force for a new National Launch
System vehicle as proposed by the House, but rather agree to provide
$10,000,000 to ARPA to begin program concept definition for a new,
affordable, near-term medium launch vehicle. The conferees also agree to
provide $40,000,000 for a competitive Single Stage to Orbit (SSTO) vehicle
as proposed by the House; however, the conferees agree to modify the House
language to permit reimbursement to the Air Force for projects approved by
the Director of ARPA. Finally, the conferees also agree to provide
$10,000,000 as proposed by the House for launch technology development
projects such as hybrid propellants and parafoils.
<end of DOD space appropriations section>