Space Access Update is Space Access Society's when-there's-news publication. Space Access Society's goal is to promote affordable access to space for all, period. We believe in concentrating our limited resources at whatever point looks like yielding maximum progress toward this goal.
For the moment, our main focus is on supporting the government's "SSRT" (Single Stage Rocket Technology) program, DC-X and its recently funded followon, SX-2. Space Access Update is thus for the moment largely about the technology and politics of DC-X and SX-2, though we're increasingly covering the subject of SSTO policy in general.
We anticipate a change of focus soon if all goes well. Once SX-2 startup is (with your help!) assured, we plan to begin working on establishment of a healthy second X-rocket development track at NASA, and on getting development of suitable engines started for the fully reusable orbital transports that should come after SX-2 and NASA's X-rocket.
With luck and hard work, we should see fully reusable SSTO testbeds flying to orbit toward the end of this decade, with production prototypes a- building shortly thereafter. Join us and help us make this happen.
Henry Vanderbilt, Editor, Space Access Update
[For more info on Space Access Society or on the DC-X/SSTO video we have for sale, write us at 4855 E Warner Rd #24-150, Phoenix AZ 85044, or email hvanderbilt@bix.com.
Well, it's been three weeks since the Space Access '94 conference and four since the last Update, and things just keep on happening with no respect at all for our massive case of post-conference burnout. Grumble grumble.
Y'all remember DC-X, the little forty-foot rocket that started all this fuss, sitting under a tent out in the desert since last October, waiting for enough funding to finish its planned flight tests?
The good news is that DC-X should be checked out and ready to resume flight test sometime in May; NASA Administrator Goldin's $990,000 has kept the program alive and gotten it moving forward again these last two months.
The bad news, of course, is that the $5 million needed for actual flight test still hasn't arrived, and if it doesn't show up before the end of April, DC-X will once again be out of money and in danger of shutdown.
Chances are the money will show up; DC-X has gotten far too much good publicity to let die now. It's not at all clear yet, though, whether the funding will be from DOD or NASA.
We do know that a deal has been cut to let NASA take over the DC-X flight vehicle after the current flight test series is done -- NASA will then use DC-X as a "flying test stand" for various new bits of rocket hardware, for example lightweight aluminum-lithium propellant tanks. At least part of the purpose is to get NASA more experience with actually flight-testing experimental hardware, as opposed to running computer simulations and ground-test rigs, all that a lot of NASA researchers have had available to them in recent years.
This looks like a far better use for DC-X than sending it to a museum after a dozen or so flights. There has even been some talk of building a second copy of DC-X for backup; apparently NASA is quite serious about getting a lot of flight test mileage out of the bird.
The confusion over who will fund the rest of DC-X's current flight program stems from the larger question: Will DOD, NASA, or both get the job of continuing the SSTO development path begun with DC-X?
The good news is that at this point, just about everyone wants to continue toward reusable Single Stage To Orbit space transports. The question now is, who gets to do them and how?
The faction at NASA that wants to do an SSTO Shuttle II for a mere forty billion dollars or so is pretty much out of the running, barring some really bizarre political lightning striking. At a time when OMB is seriously proposing killing both Station and Shuttle as options to save money at NASA, a massive new Shuttle II project seems rather unlikely to be funded. Those sectors of NASA are likely to have their hands full just keeping Shuttle funded and flying, something we at SAS support, by the way.
We understand that NASA Administrator Goldin has a considerably more realistic SSTO plan, one that calls for spending $900 million over the rest of the decade on SSTO technology, culminating in the "X-2000", a flight demonstrator roughly equivalent to DOD's proposed SX-2 -- a no-payload test vehicle that would fly as high and fast as possible with available technology, possibly upgradable to the point where it could reach orbit.
The first two years under this plan would be spent working on component technologies, with an actual flight vehicle start in FY'97. This is slower than a lot of people would like, but probably realistic given NASA's lack of recent experience with experimental flight vehicle ("X-vehicle") development.
DOD, of course, wants to build SX-2 to fly as high and fast as possible within the available budget, starting almost immediately -- a lot of the advance work is already done, and the SX-2 design competition could be well underway before the summer is over.
In this connection, we hear that General Moorman delivered his report last week to Deputy Secretary of Defense Deutch and Secretary of the Air Force Widnall, and that Moorman included as part of every one of the options listed in the report (see SAU #32 for details) significant ongoing USAF funding for SX-2 and for SSTO technology in general. This proposed USAF SSTO funding is said to have Secretary Widnall's support.
If Deutch and Secretary of Defense Perry go along with this, SX-2 has a home. For what it's worth, 34 Congressmen from both parties recently signed a letter urging Secretary Perry to release funds for SX-2 immediately, including Representatives Schroeder and Gingrich.
A lot of people seem to be assuming that NASA X-2000 versus DOD SX-2 is an either/or question and taking sides, which muddies the waters no end. Given the complementary abilities present in DOD and NASA, given that peak funding for SX-2 would occur a couple years before peak funding for X-2000 so both could be done within an overall funding level on the order of $150 million per year, and given that SX-2 and X-2000 are aimed at exploring different but complementary approaches to SSTO (SX-2 will emphasize lightweight structures and X-2000 improved engines) we at SAS believe it is both advantageous and fiscally prudent to proceed with both, rather than putting all our launch eggs in one basket again.
Unfortunately, a couple of influential parties don't agree with us.
A draft version of the upcoming White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) space transportation strategy report is making the rounds. This OSTP report does say a lot of the right things about what's wrong with US space launch policy and how to fix it.
Unfortunately, this prerelease draft has a major problem: it recommends giving SSTO tech demonstrator work exclusively to NASA, leaving DOD nothing to do but tinker with existing expendables. We think SSTO work at NASA is wonderful - as long as it's in parallel with and complementary to the existing proven successful effort at DOD. Giving NASA an SSTO monopoly would be a mistake.
We're appending a copy of this OSTP draft paper - it's about six pages long.
Meanwhile, we hear the National Space Society (NSS) has sent out a letter to all their members asking for donations for an effort to promote SSTO. They too are now saying a lot of the right things about what's wrong with US space launch policy, and are proposing to do some fairly useful things in the way of advancing SSTO.
Unfortunately, the immediate action NSS is calling on their members for (aside from sending money, of course) is to sign and send on to VP Gore an NSS-provided form letter that calls for transfer of "the Delta Clipper program" to "a suitable agency", and freeing up the $40 million in SSRT funding "for DC-Y".
So what's wrong with this picture? Well, "Delta Clipper" and "DC-Y" are proprietary projects of one particular aerospace company. "SSRT" is the actual current project name, "SSTO" is the generic name for the technology, and "SX-2", the consensus next step in the SSRT program, is by law to be an open-to-bid design competition. NSS, intentionally or not, is calling for their members to support one particular contractor here rather than a fair and open competition.
NSS is also calling for support for a more ambitious SSTO project than is likely to be funded anytime soon -- DC-Y as last we saw it defined (a 1.4 million lb gross liftoff-weight orbital vehicle with a 20,000 lb payload) is too expensive for the current budget climate. SX-2 is far more realistic; a representative of the company proposing DC-Y has in fact acknowledged this, in Aerospace Daily for 3/21/93, page 433.
Finally, NSS is implicitly calling for SSTO to be transferred to NASA -- the only possible "suitable agency" other than DOD where SSTO now resides is NASA. They make this explicit in the postscript of their fundraising letter; they want SSTO moved to NASA, lock, stock and barrel.
We welcome NSS's formal entry into support of SSTO. However, we would feel much more comfortable with NSS's support if they demonstrated more knowledge of the subtleties involved. Talk to us, guys.
Space Access '94 went extremely well programmatically, and moderately well attendance-wise at around a hundred and ten people on site. Ask someone who was there about the programming.
We're looking at a date in April next year, likely either the first or third weekend, in order to avoid the Phoenix "spring training" hotel space/air travel crunch we hit this year. We'd be interested in your comments on possible conflicts in those two weekends; drop us a note.
We'll be posting a list of SA'94 talks with capsule reviews in the next month or so, when we get the videotapes organized. We will be offering tapes of some or all of the talks, details to be announced. Meanwhile, if you want your name on a list to be sent SA'94 videotape info once we get things organized, drop us a note, email or snailmail.
We have a bunch of things you can do this week. None of them are life-or- death, but all of them would be useful.
You can write OSTP and tell them that in regard to the draft report on national space transportation strategy that has been circulating, you think it would be a mistake to transfer all SSTO responsibility to NASA. Ask them to support SSTO work in both DOD and NASA. Keep letters polite and concise. The address to write is:
Mr Richard DalbelloIf you're an NSS member and received their fundraiser, you might let them know where you think they're off the mark, assuming you do think so. Given that they're asking for your money, it's a good opportunity to let them know how you might actually be interested in having your money spent and what it might take to get you to send some.
And NSS member or not, you might write VP Gore and let him know you think he should support immediate release of the $40 million in DOD SSTO funding, and support future SSTO work in both DOD and NASA, as being important to the nation's future competitiveness, both economic and military. The address is:
The Vice President of the United States
***
Henry Vanderbilt "Reach low orbit and you're halfway to anywhere
Space Access Society in the Solar System."
4855 E Warner Rd #24-150 - Robert A. Heinlein
Phoenix, AZ 85044
602 431-9283 voice/fax "You can't get there from here."
(hvanderbilt@bix.com) - Anonymous
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Draft 3-25-94
National Space Transportation Strategy
Introduction
This policy directive defines a National Space
Transportation Strategy and provides guidance to U.S. government
agencies responsible for implementing U.S. space transportation
policy and programs. This directive supersedes previous
directive regarding space transportation.
Assuring dependable and affordable access to space is a
fundamental goal of the U.S. space program. In support of this
fundamental goal, the U.S. government will:
o Maintain and improve the systems required to ensure safe
and reliable access to, transportation in, and return
from, space to meet U.S. civil and national security
objectives;
o Reduce significantly the costs of space transportation
through cost-effective improvements;
o Support R&D critical to the development of future space
transportation systems;
o Encourage the growth of a competitive U.S. commercial
launch industry, and;
o Maintain a strong launch-related technology base.
Space Transportation Strategy
The National Space Transportation Strategy is to:
(1) Ensure that existing U.S. space launch capabilities,
including support facilities, are sufficient to meet the
national needs for transport of personnel and payloads to
and from space;
(2) Pursue cost-effective improvements in the cost of current
launch systems while protecting their reliability and
safety;
(3) Implement an advanced technology program to support future
decisions on the development of next generation reusable
space launch capabilities that greatly reduce the cost of
access to space;
(4) Utilize commercially provided products and services when
available and cost-effective, and encourage the growth of
the U.S. commercial space launch industry.
This strategy will be implemented within the overall resource and
policy guidance provided by the President.
Strategy Implementation Guidelines
This strategy shall be implemented as follows:
(1) The Department of Defense will be responsible for
modernization of the current U.S. expendable space launch
fleet. The DoD shall develop a detailed modernization plan
that reduces the cost of space launch through cost-effective
improvements, building upon investments made in existing
space launch vehicles, facilities, and infrastructure.
(2) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will
pursue an advanced technology program to prepare the
technologies required to develop a cost-effective next
generation reusable launch system, such as the single-stage-
to-orbit concept. NASA will also reduce the cost of
operating the Space Shuttle while protecting system safety.
(3) DoD and NASA will encourage private sector partnerships,
consortia, and other arrangements for investments in
existing and future launch capabilities, including advanced
technologies. These agencies will actively consider
innovative government-industry partnerships in pursuing dual
use technologies.
In pursuit of their individual responsibilities, NASA and
DoD will cooperate to take advantage of the unique skills of each
agency to ensure successful implementation of this strategy.
General Guidelines
(1) A mixed fleet, comprised of the Space Shuttle and existing
expendable launch vehicles, will continue to be the primary
U.S. Government means to transport personnel and payloads to
and from space for the foreseeable future.
(2) The Department of Defense and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration will plan for the transition of space
programs to future launch systems in a manner which ensures
mission continuity and fully funds transition costs.
Civil Space Transportation Guidelines
(1) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will
maintain the capability to conduct human space flight,
including the capability to operate the Space Shuttle fleet
and space launch facilities (launch and recovery, payload
processing, tracking and data acquisition and mission
control) necessary to support the Space Shuttle program.
(a) The Space Shuttle will used only for missions that
require human presence or other unique Shuttle
capabilities, or for which use of the Shuttle is
determined to be important for national security,
foreign policy, or other compelling purposes;
(b) The Space Shuttle will continue to be managed and
operated in an institutional arrangement consistent
with the current NASA/DoD Memorandum of Understanding.
Responsibility will remain in NASA for operational
control of the Shuttle for civil missions, and in the
DoD for operational control of the Shuttle for national
security missions. Mission management is the
responsibility of the mission agency;
(c) Pending a decision on a next-generation launch system,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will
maintain the Space Shuttle system and pursue
appropriate upgrades to ensure its viability,
reliability, safety, and cost effectiveness. For
planning purposes, NASA should assume that Space
Shuttle operation continue until the end of the Space
Station's planned lifetime.
(d) Construction of additional Space Shuttle orbiters is
not planned.
(2) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration will be
the lead agency for technology for advanced next generation
reusable launch systems.
(a) Technology efforts will focus on earth-to-orbit launch
and re-entry systems;
(b) Technology and development efforts, including
operational concepts, will be coordinated with the
Department of Defense;
(c) NASA will encourage private sector partnerships,
consortia, and other arrangements which facilitate the
effective implementation of next generation reusable
launch systems;
(d) Research shall be focused to support an FY'97 budget
decision to proceed with a sub-scale flight
demonstration program.
National Security Related Space Transportation Guidelines
(1) The Department of Defense will maintain the capability to
operate those launch systems and facilities necessary to
meet national security requirements;
(2) The Department of Defense is responsible for modernization
of the existing expendable launch vehicle fleet. DoD will
focus on measures that can reduce total costs while
improving reliability and responsiveness. As part of this
effort, the DoD will develop guidelines for standardization
of payload interfaces and integration processes.
(a) Modernization plans will be coordinated with the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
Department of Transportation/
(b) The Department of Defense will encourage private sector
partnerships, consortia, and other arrangements which
facilitate the effective implementation of approved
modernization activities.
(c) The Department of Defense will develop plans to
maintain the Titan launch system pending a decision on
a follow on launch system
(d) DoD and NASA will combine their procurement of
expendable launch vehicles and related services when
this would reduce total cost to the government.
(3) DoD, in coordination with NASA, will pursue dual use
technologies, including those applicable to private sector
space activities.
Commercial Space Transportation Guidelines
(1) The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the
Department of Defense will utilize commercial space launch
systems and facilities where feasible;
(2) The United States Government is committed to encouraging a
viable commercial U.S. space launch industry.
(a) The Department of Transportation will license and
promote commercial launch operations as set forth in the
Commercial Space Launch Act and Executive Order 12455;
(b) Commercial space transportation objectives will be met
without the use of direct Federal subsidies;
(c) The U.S. Government will provide for the timely
transfer to the private sector of unclassified
Government-developed space transportation technologies
in such a manner as to protect their commercial value;
(3) U.S. Government agencies, in acquiring space launch-related
capabilities, will:
(a) Emphasize procurement strategies which are based on the
use of commercially offered space products and
services;
(b) Provide for private sector retention of technical data
rights, except those necessary to comply with statutory
responsibilities;
(c) Encourage private sector and State and local government
investment and participation in the development and
improvement of U.S. launch systems and facilities;
(d) Incentivize private sector investments, as is feasible,
through "anchor tenancy" or "first-buyer" commitments for
innovative, lower-cost commercial space launch services;
(4) The U.S. Government will seek to negotiate and maintain
multilateral agreements with other nations which define
principles of free and fair trade and limit certain
government supports and unfair practices in the
international market for commercial space launch services.
(a) International space launch trade agreements must
support an effective means of enforcement with a range
of options to deter, and if necessary respond to, non-
compliance;
(b) The United States Government will not enter into a
space launch trade agreement with any nation that has
not committed to observe the guidelines and Annex of
the Missile Technology Control Regime;
(c) International space launch trade agreements must be
consistent with United States technology transfer
policies and with obligations under arms control
agreements.
Use of Foreign Launch Systems or Hardware
(1) The United States Government will not purchase space launch
services from foreign launch providers if comparable U.S.
capabilities are available, except for reasons of national
security and foreign policy as approved by the President.
(a) Foreign launch systems may be used on a non-
reimbursable basis to support the space station,
international scientific programs, or other cooperative
government-to-government programs.
(2) The U.S. Government will not inhibit the use of foreign
components or technologies in upgrading U.S. space launch
systems or developing next-generation space transportation
systems except as required by national security, foreign
policy, public safety, or law.
Excess Ballistic Missiles
(1) U.S. excess ballistic missiles will either be retained for
government use or destroyed. Requests from within the DoD or
from other government agencies for use of excess ballistic
missiles assets will be considered on a case-by-case basis
by DoD. Use of these assets will permitted for orbital
launch when each of the following conditions are met:
(a) The payload supports the sponsoring agency's mission,
for example, for government authorized or sponsored
research, technology development and test,
experimentation or education and training for U.S.
government authorized or sponsored research, technology
development, experimentation, or education and
training;
(b) The use of excess ballistic missile assets is
consistent with U.S. international obligations,
including MTCR guidelines and the START treaty; and,
(d) The U.S. commercial launch industry is given an
opportunity to provide launch services that meet the
performance, schedule, and risk requirements of the
mission, and the price for such services is determined
to clearly exceed to comparable cost of using an excess
ballistic missile asset.
(2) Private sector bidders should also have the opportunity to
utilize excess ballistic missiles in support of a government
contract which meets the above requirements. DoD will
retain ownership and accountability and maintain control and
supervision of all assets and related government furnished
equipment and negotiate and monitor all launch operations.
(3) National Security Council and the Office of Science and
Technology Policy will initiate a review the issue of
domestic use of foreign excess ballistic missiles.
Implementing Actions
United States Government agencies are directed to undertake
the following actions to implement this policy:
(1) The Secretary of Defense, with the support of other agencies
as required, will provide an implementation plan to the
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
by July 1 1994. This plan will include schedule and funding
requirements for implementation of this strategy as well as
plans to develop government-industry partnership to pursue
dual use technologies. As part of this effort, the DoD in
concert with NASA and the commercial sector, will develop
guidelines for standardization of payload interfaces and
integration processes. The goal of this modernization
program will be to significantly reduce the government's
cost of using the current expendable space transportation
fleet.
(2) The Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, with the support of other agencies as
required, will provide an implementation plan to the
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
by July 1, 1994. This plan will include schedule, and
funding requirements for implementation of this strategy,
including plans to develop government-industry partnerships
to pursue dual use technologies.
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