Space Access Update is Space Access Society's when-there's-news publication. Space Access Society's goal is to promote affordable access to space for all, period. We believe in concentrating our limited resources at whatever point looks like yielding maximum progress toward this goal.
For the moment, our main focus is on supporting the government's "SSRT" (Single Stage Rocket Technology) program, DC-X and its recently funded followon, SX-2. Space Access Update is thus for the moment largely about the technology and politics of DC-X and SX-2, though we also cover the subject of reusable SSTO (Single Stage To Orbit) policy in general.
We anticipate a change of focus soon if all goes well. Once SX-2 startup is (with your help!) assured, we plan to begin working on establishment of a healthy second X-rocket development track at NASA, and on getting development of suitable engines started for the fully reusable orbital transports that should come after SX-2 and NASA's X-rocket.
With luck and hard work, we should see fully reusable SSTO testbeds flying to orbit toward the end of this decade, with production prototypes a- building shortly thereafter. Join us and help us make this happen.
Henry Vanderbilt, Editor, Space Access Update
[For more info on Space Access Society or on the DC-X/SSTO video we have for sale, write us at 4855 E Warner Rd #24-150, Phoenix AZ 85044, or email hvanderbilt@bix.com.
We've got a long one this week -- there's a fair amount of news, but much of the length is in the appended pieces. We have a couple hundred lines of recent House DOD funding bill space launch research language, plus a rewritten backgrounder on the Congressional budgetmaking process.
Yes, it's that time of year again -- the great funding hunt is once again on, and for those who want to make a difference, it's once more unto the phones and postboxes and fax machines.
Our apologies for the fact that some of this news is two weeks old. There's always the temptation to wait for another piece of the picture to fall into place first, and sometimes it just refuses to fall. The good news is that most of what we're late reporting on here is in fact good news...
The House Armed Services Committee, during their "markup" the week before last, the Congress's first pass at revising the Defense Department portion of the Administration's FY'95 budget proposal, added $100 million to the coming year's DOD budget for:
"..a competitive reusable rocket technology demonstration program, including... ..use of at least 90% of such amount for development and flight testing of one or more technology demonstration vehicles..."
IE, they want to allot $100 million for SX-2 next year. We're still a long way from a final budget, but this is a very encouraging first step.
The HASC language goes on to say a number of other rather interesting things, among these a general endorsement of the DC-X/SX-2 approach to SSTO, and a specific requirement that this $100 million only be used in a program run by DOD -- a shot across the bows for any attempt to give NASA an SSTO monopoly. The authorization language and the accompanying report section are attached to the end of this newsletter; they are worth a close look.
Our overall read on this is that SSTO via the SX-2 route has a lot more support within the House of Representatives than it did a year ago. You may recall that we asked y'all to hold off pro-SSTO pressure on the HASC members prior to this markup, in SAU #34 back at the start of May, since we'd heard that things were already on track. There was a lot of insider effort involved, but it looks like the basic awareness of SSTO really was already there this time around -- a tangible result of a lot of hard work over the last couple of years. Our thanks to all concerned.
The HASC also added $100 million to begin long-overdue upgrades to the existing stable of expendable boosters, in lieu of any new expendable startup. We understand there's considerable room for increasing the operability of current expendables with a relatively small investment, and we don't have much choice about relying on these expendables for years to come. This is in line with the Moorman Report recommendations, and we at SAS think it's a good idea.
The House as a whole should be through amending and voting on their version of the FY'95 DOD authorization bill around the end of May. We don't anticipate any changes in the SSTO provisions during that process.
The next major hurdle for FY'95 SX-2 funding is the Senate Armed Services Committee DOD Authorization markup, currently expected to begin around a week into June, a few legislative days after the House wraps up their version.
While there are some strong SSTO supporters on SASC, last year support for SSTO was much weaker in the Senate than in the House. If the Senate can be persuaded to match the House SX-2 funding language, inclusion in the final FY'95 DOD budget is near certain. If the Senate leaves SSTO out, things could go down to the wire again as they did last year.
Meanwhile, the Administration is still sitting on $35 million in FY'94 SX-2 funding, in theory still waiting on various long-overdue space launch policy reports the Congress asked for last fall. What this means is that release of the SX-2 RFP (Request For Proposals) to interested aerospace companies, the first major step in picking a design and contractor, is still on hold.
Representative Rohrabacher's pending anti-impoundment lawsuit, to force the release of the $35 million, is also (temporarily) on hold while things shake out. With luck, it won't be necessary, as pressure to get going on SX-2 is building.
The "Moorman Report" on future DOD space launch policy was finally delivered to Congress in mid-May by Assistant Secretary of Defense John Deutch. There's an eighty-page executive summary circulating on Capitol Hill, but alas we still haven't seen a copy. Space News has, though; what they say in their May 16-22 issue (page 3) indicates the Moorman Report still matches the broad outline we've reported in past issues, with four main options presented, with no DOD preference indicated. In order of increasing cost, these options are:
The Moorman Report now echoes OSTP's call for NASA being the "lead agency" in SSTO research; we hear this may be a result of Assistant Secretary of Defense John Deutch's input into the final version. The Moorman Report also makes clear, however, that joint DOD-NASA projects should be avoided like the plague, given the poor record of such in recent years. The two agencies should instead coordinate administratively separate research programs, which makes sense to us.
Meanwhile, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)'s proposed national space launch policy is now supposed to go to a new body called the National Science and Technology Council, for final rewrite before the President signs it. We've seen nothing new about the content since the draft version that made the rounds in late April, but we have no reason to believe there have been substantial changes.
One reading of that OSTP draft (and now of the companion Moorman Report) is that it could still allow DOD SX-2 to go ahead, as long as NASA is the nominal overall lead agency for SSTO work. NASA would then look at the early SX-2 data plus NASA's experience operating the DC-Xa (See "NASA To Fly DC-X?" story below) and decide whether to commence design of an unmanned subscale full- orbital SSTO testbed in FY'97, to flight-demo all the necessary technologies by the end of the decade, as called for in the OSTP draft.
Not much new on this since SAU #34. $5.1 million was released by ARPA at the start of May, and McDonnell-Douglas has received $3.5 million of this and is preparing to fly DC-X again, possibly as early as mid-June. Tossing in a reasonable Murphy factor, chances are the next flight will be in late June or early July. The other $1.6 million will go to White Sands for test range costs.
The number of flights and the exact flight test profiles are still up in the air -- there could be anywhere from three to six flights, depending on a lot of factors, among them how long the money lasts this time.
We understand that the first flight of the new series should reach an altitude of 2,850 feet and a maximum angle-of-attack of 70 degrees. A three-day (or less?) turnaround test and an end-for-end rotation maneuver are definitely among the tests planned for the new flight series.
Plans are firming up for NASA to take over DC-X for use as a "flying test stand" once this summer's flight test series is over. The idea would be to use DC-X to flight test new SSTO-related hardware items, among them lightweight aluminum-lithium and graphite-epoxy propellant tanks. DC-X's current boilerplate tanks would be replaced in a major rebuild; the resulting vehicle would be called the DC-Xa, and could then be incrementally modified to eventually become capable of relatively high speeds and altitudes.
There has been some discussion of building a second DC-Xa to reduce program downtime in the event of damage to or loss of the original vehicle during these future tests.
Various NASA and other centers are participating in this summer's DC-X tests to prepare for future roles in SSTO research. NASA Dryden will help with aerodynamic analysis for the upcoming flights, while NASA Marshall will be observing the tests to prepare for its planned role as program manager for the DC-Xa followon flight program.
USAF's Phillips Lab meanwhile will run this summer's test program -- Phillips Lab, near Albuquerque New Mexico, is likely to manage SX-2 for the Air Force when and if that program gets the green light.
The next critical point in the SX-2 funding path we can usefully work on is the upcoming Senate Armed Services Committee markup of next year's DOD budget. As in the House, on a matter as relatively minor as SX-2 funding, the final Senate version probably won't change from the Armed Services Committee's markup -- we need to persuade SASC members to support this path to SSTO.
We actually have some time to work this one; SASC's markup is unlikely to get underway before the start of the second week in June. Just as well, since what we need to do now is inform and persuade Senators (and their staffers) who may not be all that SSTO-aware yet.
Write or fax any Senators on the SASC from your state. Ask them to support the House Defense Authorizations language providing $100 million for SSTO work within the USAF.
If you feel ambitious, give them some background on what this will buy (SX-2) and why that's a good thing. Make the general case in favor of doing SSTO via the SX-2 route -- having DOD build a fast and cheap followon to DC-X, an SSTO technologies testbed, an X-rocket intended to fly as high and fast as possible in three years on $300 million - $400 million total, developing and demonstrating the technologies needed for a practical SSTO transport.
And of course, as far as possible follow the usual rules - keep it to one page, make the main point right at the start, and above all be polite -- both we and the overworked staffers who have to read these thank you.
-- Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) --
("Senator XYZ", office#, "Washington DC 20510" will get mail to them.)
Name office# phone fax (AC 202)
Sam Nunn (D-GA) SASC Chair SD-303 224-3521 224-0072
Strom Thurmond (R-SC) RRM SR-217 224-5972 224-1300
James Exon (D-NE) SH-528 224-4224 224-5213
John McCain (R-AZ) SR-111 224-2235 224-8938
Richard C. Shelby (D-AL) SH-509 224-5744 224-3416
William S. Cohen (R-ME) SH-322 224-2523 224-2693
Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA) SR-315 224-4543 224-2417
Carl Levin (D-MI) SR-459 224-6221 224-1388
Dan Coats (R-IN) SR-404 224-5623 224-1966
Trent Lott (R-MS) SR-487 224-6253 224-2262
Bob Smith (R-NH) SD-332 224-2841 224-1353
Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) SH-110 224-5521 224-1810
John Glenn (D-OH) SH-503 224-3353 224-7983
John Warner (R-VA) SR-225 224-2023 224-6295
Joseph I. Lieberman (D-CT) SH-316 224-4041 224-9750
Bob Graham (D-FL) SH-524 224-3041 224-6843
Dirk Kempthorne (D-ID) SD-367 224-6142 224-5893
Lauch Faircloth (R-NC) SH-702 224-3154 224-7406
Charles S. Robb (D-VA) SR-493 224-4024 224-8689
Robert C. Byrd (D-WV) SH-311 224-3954 224-8070
Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) SH-703 224-5922 224-0776
We would appreciate feedback, both on the above fax numbers (not all are
current) and on any indications you may get as to which Senators already
support SSTO.
Henry Vanderbilt "Reach low orbit and you're halfway to anywhere
Space Access Society in the Solar System."
4855 E Warner Rd #24-150 - Robert A. Heinlein
Phoenix, AZ 85044
602 431-9283 voice/fax "You can't get there from here."
(hvanderbilt@bix.com) - Anonymous
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-- piece, including the copyright and this notice. All other rights --
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***
From The House of Representatives'
FY '95 Defense Department Authorization Bill
H.R. 4301
103rd Congress, 2nd Session
Division A Department of Defense
Authorizations
Title II Research, Development, Test, and
Evaluation
Subtitle B Program Requirements, Restrictions,
and Limitations
SEC. 211. SPACE LAUNCH MODERNIZATION.
(a) POLICY.---
(1) It is in the Nation's long-term national security and
economic interests to regain preeminence in the area of space
launch technology and operations.
(2) Access to space at affordable costs is fundamental to
maintaining required command, control, communications,
intelligence, navigation, weather, and early warning support to
United States and coalition forces.
(3) Encouragement of privately financed, cost effective
expendable and reusable launch vehicles is in the economic
interest of the Department of Defense and the United States
Government.
(b) REQUIRED ACTIONS.---The Secretary of Defense shall take the
following actions in pursuance of the space launch modernization policy set
forth in subsection (a):
(1) Begin and complete a program to replace or consolidate the
current fleet of medium and heavy expendable launch vehicles
with new or upgraded expendable launch vehicles or with a
combination of expendable and reusable launch vehicles. The
Secretary shall initiate flight tests of new or upgraded expendable
launch vehicles and of reusable launch vehicles not later than
1998 to achieve an initial launch capability for selected
replacement vehicles not later than July 1, 2002. The program
shall include a fly-before-buy acquisition strategy with both
advanced concept technology demonstrations of expendable
launch vehicles and advanced technology demonstrations of
reusable launch vehicles.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), initiate a competitive
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program to
achieve a cost reduction over current medium and heavy
expendable launch vehicles of at least 15 percent in flyaway cost
per pound (in fiscal year 1994 dollars) and at least 25 percent
reduction in launch operations costs per launch (in fiscal year
1994 dollars).
(3) Encourage and evaluate innovative acquisition, technical,
and financing (including best commercial practices) solutions for
providing affordable, operable, reliable, and responsive access to
space.
(4) Centralize oversight of launch requirements of the
Department of Defense and other users to preclude inflated
requirements from escalating current and future launch costs.
(5) Encourage and provide incentives for the use of
commercial practices in the acquisition, operation, and support of
Department of Defense space operations.
(6) Establish effective suitable coordination among military,
civilian, and commercial launch developers and users.
(c) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.---Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated in section 201(3), $200,000,000 shall be available for
research, development, test, and evaluation of non-man-rated space
launch systems and technologies. Of that amount---
(1) $100,000,000 shall be available only for a competitive
reusable rocket technology demonstration program, including---
(A) use of at least 90 percent of such amount for
development and flight testing of one or more technology
demonstration vehicles, and
(B) further development of reusable rocket technologies;
and
(2) $100,000,000 shall be available only for an Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration program for expendable
launch vehicles, including---
(A) competitive development and flight testing of advanced
concept technology demonstration vehicles, and
(B) further development of enhanced technologies related to
expendable launch vehicles, including Russian rocket
propulsion technology.
(d) LIMITATIONS.---
(1) Not more than 2 percent of the funds made available by
subsection (c) may be used for direct and indirect Department of
Defense-related program office, contractor support, and
management overhead costs.
(2) Program office staff may not exceed 10 individuals,
including contractor support.
(3) None of the funds authorized in this section may be
released or otherwise transferred for execution or obligation to
any Government department, agency, or organization outside
the Department of Defense.
***
From The House of Representatives'
Committee on Armed Services'
Report on the FY '95 Defense Department
Authorization Bill, H.R. 4301
103rd Congress, 2nd Session; May 10th, 1994
Space launch modernization
The committee notes the Department's continued delay in
formulating a space launch modernization plan. The Department appears
resigned to accepting increasingly expensive access to space to meet its
launch requirements, while the U.S. commercial space launch industry
continues to struggle to retain a declining share of the global launch
market. The committee believes that with the right leadership and
management approach, many of the factors contributing to high costs,
unresponsiveness in meeting launch requirements, and less than desired
system reliability and operability could be ameliorated. The committee
believes that the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization's success with both
the DC-X technology demonstrator and the Clementine satellite provides
some hope that the attributes necessary for technology development still
reside in the Department.
Several factors contribute to the current situation:
(1) No one in charge. At present, no single organization or
individual has the responsibility and authority to reconcile the
requirements and costs of satellite and space launch. Consequently,
payload developers are frequently allowed to establish satellite
requirements without sufficient regard to payload size and cost. In
addition, responsibility for launch system development and operation is
shared among many departments and agencies.
(2) Launch costs. Launch system users often are not required to pay
all direct and indirect costs to launch their payloads. Consequently, users
do not have the incentive to reduce payload size and complexity. As a
result, launch costs are driven by low use-rate, extremely high cost
systems such as Titan IV.
(3) The acquisition system. As with most Department programs,
proposed launch system programs take a decade or more to develop, have
had large program offices, and often fail to achieve inflated claims of
program goals.
As the Department marks time, the traditional expendable launch
vehicle manufacturers and the space industry entrepreneurs have
presented a variety of options for new, upgraded, and "leap-frog"
approaches to reducing the costs and improving the reliability and
responsiveness of military, civilian, and commercial access to space.
In summary, the space launch acquisition system has numerous
shortcomings, but there appears to be readily available options to make
significant, affordable improvements in space launch capability.
Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to take
several actions. First, the Secretary shall appoint an individual with
complete authority and responsibility for the development of satellite and
launch vehicle requirements. Second, the committee directs the Secretary
to initiate a program to replace or consolidate the current fleet of medium
and heavy expendable launch vehicles with new or upgraded expendable
and reusable launch vehicles. The committee believes the Secretary
should begin a program that will evaluate and select for development
industry proposals to either upgrade the Atlas or Delta expendable launch
vehicles, or to use other innovative approaches such as the use of upgraded
solid rocket motors to provide medium and heavy lift capability. The
committee recommends an additional $100 million in PE 305119F
for this purpose. The committee believes that the Department should also
pursue an aggressive technology demonstration program to demonstrate
the high return "leap-frog" potential of reusable launch vehicle
technologies. The committee recommends an additional $100 million in
PE 603302F for this purpose and recommends the Secretary take
advantage of the innovative management team and approach
demonstrated in the DC-X program. Third, the committee encourages
the Secretary to use innovative acquisition, technical, and financing
solutions to provide affordable, reliable, and responsive access to space for
military, civilian, and commercial users.
In conclusion, the committee notes that it has not received the Space
Launch Modernization Plan as required by section 213 of the National
Defense Authorization Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-160) or the
Administration's space launch vehicle policy directive. However, the
committee understands that the draft Space Launch Modernization Plan
fails to meet legislative requirements as it does not provide a "plan,"
milestones, or a "roadmap," for space launch modernization, but simply a
series of options for space launch modernization. Further, the committee
understands that the Administration is likely to recommend that another
executive agency be assigned responsibility for reusable launch vehicles.
The committee recognizes the prerogative for such action. The
committee, however, intends to authorize funding for a reusable launch
vehicle program only if it is executed by the Department of Defense. The
committee notes that jointly-managed, cost-shared space launch programs
have not been models of success.
***
Backgrounder: The Annual US Congressional Funding Process (5/23/94)
The US Congress has the power (embedded in the US Constitution) to control all
US Federal government spending. It does this on a yearly basis (multi-year
funding is very unusual) by passing into law various spending bills. The US
Federal fiscal year starts on October 1st of the previous calendar year, IE
FY '95 officially starts on Friday, October 1st, 1994.
Congress generally starts the annual budget process in early spring, and
finishes it sometime in the autumn. When parts of the budget run late, past
October 1st, Congress will pass a "continuing resolution" authorizing spending
to continue temporarily at the previous year's levels. This is less likely to
happen in even-numbered years, as Congressmen tend to want to finish early so
they can go home and campaign for reelection. 1994 is of course an election
year, with as usual all 435 Representative and 1/3rd of the 100 Senatorial
seats up for grabs. Chances are that DOD's budget will be finished earlier
than it was last year, late October.
The Congressional funding process has two phases, "Authorization", then
"Appropriation". Authorization is roughly equivalent to drawing up a shopping
list for the coming year, while Appropriation can be looked at as going
through the shopping list deciding how much of each item to actually buy.
The Congress debates and passes "Authorizations" and "Appropriations" bills
for each major area of government, about a dozen pairs of bills in all. The
ones we're concerned with are the Defense Department (DOD) Authorizations and
Appropriations bills. DOD happened to be where the necessary money and
management style was when DC-X was getting started up, and given its track
record on managing DC-X, DOD still looks like the optimum home for SX-2.
Both the House of Representatives with 435 members elected in population based
districts, and the Senate with 100 members elected two per state, draw up and
pass their own versions of each "Authorizations" and "Appropriations" bill.
Authorized budget items are often reduced or deleted in the Appropriations
process, but seldom increased, and new items are rarely added. SSTO was a
notable exception last year, getting its FY'94 $40 million as a last second
add-on to the DOD Appropriations bill. $100 million for SSTO in the House
FY'95 DOD Authorization this early in the process means we're in considerably
better shape than we were a year ago.
Authorizations bills generally originate in the appropriate specialized
committees within the House and Senate, in this case the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees (HASC and SASC). Appropriations Bills generally originate
in specialized subcommittees of the powerful House and Senate Appropriations
Committees (HAC and SAC), in this case the HAC and SAC Defense Subcommittees.
Each bill will generally go from the subcommittee that drafts it, to the full
committee that "marks it up" (modifies it), then to the full House or Senate
that will amend it and approve it in "floor votes", votes of all members.
At this point, there will be two separate versions of the bill, House and
Senate. There are a number of ways to come up with a common version for final
passage into law, but the method that concerns us is the "Conference
Committee", a committee with members from both House and Senate whose job is
to negotiate a compromise version. The Conference version is then near-
automatically approved by both House and Senate, thus becoming law.
A Conference Committee is usually made up of selected members from the House
and Senate committees that wrote the bills in the first place. Generally the
committee and subcommittee heads plus their minority party counterparts (the
"Ranking Republican Members" or RRM's on each committee and subcommittee) are
automatically included. The House and Senate don't necessarily send equal
numbers, since Conference Committee approval requires a majority among the
House members plus a majority among the Senate members - an overall majority
of Conference Committee members is not enough.
*end*